Research seminar on the normativity of logic and logical pluralism
The topic of the research seminar is pluralism in logic in connection with normative issues — such as what norms govern deductive inference in case we have a plurality of equally correct notions of logical consequence and/or truth, and how that affects logical practice.
The seminar is divided into two parts a first pert on general issues related to the normativity of logic and a second part related to assess logical pluralism with a special focus on normativity.
The following is a selection of the relevant works for the seminar. Not all of them will be discussed, but they all serve as the background of the discussion (suggestions are welcome: sebastianoDOTmoruzziATuniboDOTit).
Logic and Normativity
Broome, J. (2000). "Normative Requirements". In J. Dancy (ed.). Normativity. Oxford: OUP, pp. 78-99.
Broome, J. (2013). Rationality Through Reasoning. Oxford: Blackwell.
Field, H. and Milne, P. (2009). “The Normative Role of Logic”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1): 251-298.
Harman, G. (1986). Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ch. 1-4
Harman, G. (1999). "Rationality". In Reasoning, Meaning and Mind. Oxford: Claredon Press.
MacFarlane, J. (manuscript). “In What Sense (if Any) Is Logic Normative for Thought?”.
Steinberger, F. (manuscript). “Three Ways in Which Logic Might Be Normative”.
Steinberger, F. (manuscript). “The Normative Status of Logic”. Forthcoming in SEP.(survey)
Logical Pluralism: Criticism and Normativity
Caret, C. R. (manuscript). “The Collapse of Logical Pluralism Has Been Greatly Exagerrated”. Forthcoming in Erkenntnis.
Cook, R. T. (2010). “Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom: A Tour of Logical Pluralism”. Philosophy Compass 5 (6): 492-504.
Field, H. (2009). “Pluralism in Logic”. The Review of Symbolic Logic, 2 (2): 342-359.
Goddu, G. C. (2002). “What Exactly is Logical Pluralism?”. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2): 2018-230.
Griffiths, O. (2013). “Problems for Logical Pluralism”. History and Philosophy of Logic 34 (2): 170-182.
Keefe, R. (2014). “What Logical Pluralism Cannot Be”. Synthèse 191 (7): 1375-1390.
Michaelis, M. (forthcoming). “On a ‘Most Telling’ Argument for Paraconsistent Logic”. Synthèse: 1-16.
Priest, G. (2005). Doubt Truth to Be a Liar. Oxford: OUP. Ch. 12. (2009). “Logic: One or Many?”. In B. Brown and J. Woods. Logical Consequence: Rival Approaches. Proceedings of the 1999 Conference of the Society of Exact Philosophy. Stanmore: Hermes, pp. 22–28. (2008).
Priest, G. (2008) “Logical Pluralism Hollandaise”. Australasian Journal of Logic 6: 210-214.
Priest, G. (2014) “Logical Pluralism: Another Application for Chunk and Permeate”. Erkenntnis 79 (2): 331-338.
Read, S. (2006). “Monism: The One True Logic”. In D. Devidi and T. Kenyon (eds.). The Logical Approach to Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Graham Solomon. Springer, pp. 193-209.
Russell, G. (2008). “One True Logic?”. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (6): 593-611.
Shapiro, S. (2014). “Structures and Logic: A Case for (a) Relativism”. Erkenntnis 79: 309-329.
Turner, J. (2012). “Logic and Ontological Pluralism”. Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2): 419-448.
Williamson, T. (forthcoming) “Semantic Paradoxes and Abductive Methodology”. In B. Armour-Garb (ed.). The Relevance of The Liar. Oxford: OUP.
|On the Normativity of Logic and Logical Pluralism-I||G. Harman, Change In View: Principles of Reasoning, ch. 1.||12/10/2016||Sebastiano Moruzzi & Elena Tassoni|
|On the Normativity of Logic and Logical Pluralism-II||G. Harman, Change In View: Principles of Reasoning, ch. 2.||19/10/2016||Sebastiano Moruzzi & Elena Tassoni|
|On the Normativity of Logic and Logical Pluralism-III||J. MacFarlane (manuscript). "In What Sense (If Any) Is Logic Normative for Thought?"||26/10/2016||Elena Tassoni|
|On the Normativity of Logic and Logical Pluralism-VI||H. Field & P. Milne (2009). “The Normative Role of Logic”. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1): 251-298.||2/11/2016||tba|
|On the Normativity of Logic and Logical Pluralism-V||Steinberger, F. (manuscript) “Three Ways in Which Logic Might Be Normative||9/11/2016||tba|
|On the Normativity of Logic and Logical Pluralism-VI||16/11/2016||tba||tba|
|On the Normativity of Logic and Logical Pluralism-VII||23/11/2016||tba||tba|
|On the Normativity of Logic and Logical Pluralism-VIII||30/11/2016||tba||tba||On the Normativity of Logic and Logical Pluralism-XI||7/12/2016||tba||tba|
|On the Normativity of Logic and Logical Pluralism-X||14/12/2016||tba||tba|
It is possible to connect via webconference at http://webconference.unibo.it/cogito.