Maciej Tarnowskj: My Philosophical Position Entails “p, but I don't believe that p”: On Theoretically Motivated Moorean Assertions

Research seminar

Maciej Tarnowski (University of Warsaw):

My Philosophical Position Entails “p, but I don't believe that p”: On Theoretically Motivated Moorean Assertions

Venue: Sala Apollo, via Zamboni 38

Time: 3 pm

Abstract. In recent years many philosophers presented cases in of Moorean sentences that seem to be rationally assertible or believable (e.g., Turri 2010, Borgoni 2015, Frances 2016, Fileva, Brakel 2019), against the established view that such sentences are necessarily irrational to assert or believe. In my talk, I will evaluate the examples proposed in the literature and discuss their impact on the debate concerning an explanation of Moore-paradoxicality. I shall discuss the proposal of Annalisa Coliva (2015) of treating such cases by postulating ambiguity in the concept of "belief" used in epistemology, and offer an alternative description based on the distinction between procedural and epistemic rationality.