You are hereFilippo Ferrari and Luca Zanetti present their papers on suspension of judgment

Filippo Ferrari and Luca Zanetti present their papers on suspension of judgment


1 Jun 2017 10:00
1 Jun 2017 12:30
Europe/Rome

Filippo Ferrarri (Bonn) 'Disagreeing with the Agnostic'
Luca Zanetti (Bologna) 'The Normative Commitments of Suspension of Judgment'

Venue: Sala Rossa, via Azzo Gardino 23, Bologna.

Filippo Ferrari, 'Disagreeing with the Agnostic'

Abstract: [Brigitte, Diana and Amelie are three detectives independently working on a crime case. They enquiry into whether Mike is the murderer. After some careful investigation our three detectives come to different verdicts: Brigitte, the believer, judges that Mike is indeed the murderer, and thus comes to believe that Mike is the murderer; Diana, the disbeliever, judges that Mike is not be the murderer, and thus comes to disbelieve that Mike is the murderer; Amelie, the agnostic, suspends judgement about whether Mike is the murderer, thus becoming agnostic about that. The question I will be concerned in this paper is the following: do Brigitte, Diana and Amelie disagree about whether Mike is the murderer? More precisely, does Amelie disagree with Brigitte and Diana about whether Mike is the murderer? My main aim in this talk is to offer an account of both the phenomenon of disagreement and of the attitude of suspended judgement which not only accommodates the thought that Brigitte, Diana and Amelie genuinely disagree about whether Mike is the murderer, but it also satisfies what I call the alignment requirement. I will first elaborate on a doxastic-non-cotenability view of disagreement (MacFarlane 2014); second, following some recent work by Friedman (2013), (2015), I will provide an account of the attitude of suspended judgement. The focus will be in particular on the normative profile associated with the attitude of suspended judgement in contrast with that of belief and disbelief. My proposal is to understand part of the normative profiles of these attitudes in terms of the normative commitments they engender in the context of enquiry. I will then show how we can account for the thought that Brigitte, Diana and Amelie genuinely disagree about whether Mike is the murderer in a way that respects the alignment requirement]

Luca Zanetti 'The Normative Commitments of Suspension of Judgment'

First, I distinguish between a first-personal investigation into the nature of conscious reflexive suspension of judgment and a third-personal investigation into the nature of suspension of judgment conceived as a dispositional state. I put on a side the latter and concentrate on the former. I distinguish between two kinds of suspension of judgments. Definitive suspension of judgment about p/not-p is committed to there being conclusive reasons for believing that there are no conclusive reasons for believing p/not-p. Temporary suspension of judgment about p/not-p is committed to there being conclusive reasons for believing that, relative to a given body of evidence, there are no conclusive reasons for believing p/not-p. I then discuss and respond to several objections to this account that can be extracted by Friedman's (2013) (2015) work on suspension of judgment. Then I argue that suspension of judgment is not a sui general mental state but is rather reducible to a judgment about one's own evidence. Finally, I draw some important consequences for epistemology, namely that Pyrrhonian scepticism is both incoherent and untenable.

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