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Questions for Chalmers

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List of questions to ask Chalmers on June 7th.
Michele's questions:
(1) On Propositions
You believe that Quine’s last section of “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” raises a serious challenge to a priori scrutability since it undermines the a priori – a posteriori distinction.
The strategy you deploy in order to respond to Quine's challenge is to show that whenever we hold true an a posteriori sentence in the face of countervailing empirical evidence, and whenever we revise the truth of an a priori sentence on the basis of empirical evidence, retention and revision are triggered by conceptual change. That is to say, retention or revision of the sentences are explained by the fact that their meaning is changed between t1 and t2.
Yet, as you rightly notice, when we invoke intensional notions (such as meaning) in order to respond to Quine’s challenge, we almost beg the question against the Quinean, for the Quinean rejects intensional notions altogether.
However, you try to avoid this worry by adopting a Bayesian analysis of retention and revision. Your strategy hinges on a version of the principle of conditionalisation for sentences which follows from conditionalisation for propositions plus the claim that when sentence S expresses p for a subject at that time, then cr(S) = cr(p), and the claim that the content of a sentence is the proposition it expresses.
Bayesianism needs propositions (sets of possible worlds) for mathematical reasons. So, it seems that in your attempt to avoid question-begging arguments against the Quinean, you are committed to a framework, i.e. Bayesianism, which does encapsulate propositions. So, I believe that the Bayesian analysis you advocate against Quine’s objection still begs the question against Quine, for it rests on the principle of conditionalisation for sentences which stems from two theses: (a) conditionalisation for propositions; (b) sentences express propositions. The Quinean rejects both (a) and (b).
I think that this question is relevant for your project in general. You write: “One of my purposes is to use scrutability theses to provide support for a Fregean view of propositions” (p. 43). Yet, since Bayesian conditionalisation commits one to propositions, you are somehow assuming a view you’ll be arguing for.

(2) Bayesianism and the a priori
Probability calculus constrains every probability distribution to assign probability 1 to any theorem of classical propositional logic (and 0 to its negation).
On closer inspection, this shows that Bayesianism is committed to some sort of a priori/a posteriori distinction. Since there could be no Bayesian account of how empirical evidence might make it rational to adopt a theory with a non-classical logic, the Bayesian should maintain that these laws are justified (or known) a priori. For in order to revise them on the basis of empirical evidence, we should accept Bayesian Conditionalisation, which in turns rely on the validity of classical logic. (on this point see also Talbott’s SEP “Bayesian Epistemology” and Williamson “How Deep is the distinction between a priori and a posteriori?”.)
So, you are trying to respond to Quine’s arguments against the a priori / a posteriori distinction by using a theory, viz. Bayesianism, which somehow encapsulates this distinction.

(3) Analyticity and a priori
It is far from being clear that arguments against the semantic distinction between analytic and synthetic statements are ipso facto arguments against the epistemological distinction between sentences justified (or known) a priori and a posteriori.
Logical empiricism maintained that all a priori knowledge is of analytic truths, but Quine denied that and I’m not sure that you want to defend this claim. So, I’d like to hear something more about how you see the connection between analyticity and apriority.

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